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Collateral Estoppel Is Constitutionally Required in 
Criminal Cases Because It Is Embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause-Ashe v. Swenson* 
In the early morning of January 10, 1960, several armed masked 
men broke into a home where six men were engaged in a poker game. 
Each of the players was robbed of money and personal property be-
fore the robbers fled in a car belonging to one of the victims. Three 
men were subsequently arrested near a field where the stolen car 
had been abandoned. Petitioner Ashe was arrested separately some 
distance away. In May 1960, Ashe was tried for robbing Donald 
Knight, one of the six poker players.1 At the trial, the prosecution 
clearly proved that a holdup had occurred and that Knight had lost 
personal property. The evidence tending to prove Ashe's own partic-
ipation in the robbery, however, was weak.2 In fact, the prosecution 
never clearly established whether there were three or four robbers. 
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty due to insufficient evidence.8 
Six weeks after his acquittal, Ashe was brought to trial for the 
robbery of another of the poker players. Ashe's preliminary motion 
to dismiss based on the previous acquittal was overruled. The wit-
nesses at this second trial were substantially the same as in the first 
trial, but their testimony implicating Ashe was considerably stronger.~ 
Ashe was convicted and sentenced to a thirty-five-year term in the 
state penitentiary. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction and 
denied Ashe's plea of former jeopardy.6 Ashe attempted a collateral 
attack on the conviction in the state courts five years later, but that 
• 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
I. Specifically, Ashe was charged with robbery in the first degree in violation of 
Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.120 (1959). 
2. Two of the witnesses thought that there had been only three robbers at the 
house on the night in question and neither could identify Ashe as one of them. Another 
witness could only say that the petitioner's voice sounded very much like that of one 
of the robbers. A fourth witness could identify Ashe only by his "size and height, and 
his actions." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 438 (1970). 
3. The jury was instructed that if it found that Ashe was one of the participants 
in the robbery, then the theft of any money from the victim, a fact clearly shown 
by the testimony, would sustain a conviction. 397 U.S. at 439 nn.2 & 3. 
4. Two witnesses that had been unable to identify Ashe in the first trial testified 
in the second that his "features, size, and mannerism" matched those of one of the 
robbers. 397 U.S. at 440. Another witness who earlier could only identify Ashe by his 
size and actions recollected the sound of Ashe's voice at the second trial. Finally, the 
state did not call the one witness whose testimony in the first trial had been most 
damaging to the prosecution's case. 397 U.S. at 440. 
5. State v. Ashe, 850 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961). 
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attempt was equally unsuccessful.6 Ashe then brought a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding, claiming that the second trial had violated 
his constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy.7 The district 
court, and later the court of appeals,8 both felt constrained, upon the 
authority of Hoag v. New Jersey,9 from giving any relief, although 
both courts apparently found some merit in Ashe's claim.10 
The facts in Hoag were very similar to those in Ashe. The de-
fendant in Hoag was first tried for robbing three different customers 
of a tavern. He was acquitted on the basis of insufficient evidence. In 
a second trial for the robbery of a fourth customer, however, Hoag 
was convicted. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, using a funda-
mental-fairness standard,11 held that the petitioner's second trial did 
not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.12 
The Court did not consider whether collateral estoppel was required 
of the states under fourteenth amendment due process since the 
lower court had found that upon the facts of the case the previous 
conviction would not give rise to collateral estoppel.18 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not directly rule on 
the issue of collateral estoppel in Hoag, that case has been cited as 
authority by courts in rejecting arguments that collateral estoppel is 
required by fourteenth amendment due process.14 The case has been 
cited as authority both because it presented such a classic example 
of a situation in which collateral estoppel would apply, and because 
of dictum in which Justice Harlan expressed "grave doubts whether 
6. State v. Ashe, 403 S.W .2d 589 (Mo. 1966). 
7. Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
8. Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F .2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968). 
9. 356 U.S. 464 (1958). 
10. Judge Oliver of the district court said, "However persuasive the dissenting 
opinions in the Hoag case may be, it is the duty of this Court to follow the law as 
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States until it expresses a contrary view. 
Certainly the factual circumstances of this case provide an excellent opportunity for 
reexamination of the questions presented." 289 F. Supp. at 873. Judge-now Justice-
Blackmun of the Eighth Circuit, in referring to a suggestion that Hoag v. New Jersey 
not be followed, commented for the majority, "It usually is difficult for a lower federal 
court to forecast with assurance a Supreme Court decision as to the continuing validity 
of a holding of a decade ago by a Court then divided as closely as possible. This is 
particularly so when the decision is in the rapidly developing and sensitive area of 
the criminal law and the Fourteenth Amendment Bill of Rights relationship." 399 
F.2d at 46. 
11. Justice Harlan for the majority restated the test for determining whether a 
state has violated fourteenth amendment due process as "whether such a course has 
led to fundamental unfairness." 356 U.S. at 467, For a critical discussion of fourteenth 
amendment due process standards, see Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process 
Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957). 
12. 356 U.S. at 466, 
13. 356 U.S. at 471. 
14. A good example of this reasoning may be found in the Eighth Circuit opinion 
on Ashe's appeal. 399 F.2d at 45. 
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collateral estoppel [ could] be regarded as a constitutional require-
ment. "15 
When the Supreme Court decided Hoag, however, the guarantee 
of the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause had not yet been 
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment; nor 
had the double jeopardy clause been made applicable to the states at 
the time of the decision of the court of appeals in Ashe. After that 
decision, however, the Supreme Court declared, in Benton v. Mary-
land,16 that the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause was enforce-
able against the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 
The double jeopardy clause, as it is now employed in both the 
federal and state courts, consists of two basic rules: first, once a man 
is convicted, he may not be reprosecuted in order to impose upon 
him another sentence for the same offense; and second, once a man 
is acquitted, he may not be reprosecuted for the same offense in 
order to give the state another chance to convict him.17 The latter 
rule, barring reprosecution after acquittal, is conceptually allied with 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel since collateral estoppel has been 
used in the federal courts to achieve the same protections for de-
fendants.18 Because of this customary interplay between the two 
doctrines in the federal courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Ashe19 to determine whether, in light of Benton, collateral estop-
pel should be made applicable to the states as part of the traditional 
double jeopardy rule. 
In a seven-to-one decision,20 the Court held that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel is constitutionally required because it "is em-
bodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeop-
ardy.''21 As defined by the Court, this doctrine "means simply that 
15. 356 U.S. at 471. 
16. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
17. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 
(18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1879). See also Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965). 
18. Theoretically, at least, collateral estoppel will not apply in the case of a con-
viction because as applied to criminal cases there is very probably no mutuality of 
estoppel-i.e., although a defendant can bar an ·issue resolved in his favor at the first 
trial from being retried, the prosecutor must have all issues that were resolved in 
his favor examined anew in each subsequent trial. Thus, if certain defenses are rejected 
by a jury, the prosecutor cannot use estoppel to bar the defendant from asserting the 
same defenses at a later trial. See, e.g., Pulley v. Norvel, 431 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1970), 
in which the court held that Ashe did not apply when the defendant was convicted 
in the first trial. For a discussion of the federal-court treatment of the mutuality-of-
estoppel doctrine, see text accompanying notes 82-86 infra. 
19. 393 U.S. lll5 (1969). 
20. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. Justice Black (397 U.S. at 447) and 
Justice Harlan (397 U.S. at 448) concurred separately, and Justice Brennan concurred in 
an opinion joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. 397 U.S. at 448. Chief Justice 
Burger dissented. 397 U.S. at 460. 
21. 397 U.S. at 445. 
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when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid 
and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the 
same parties in any future lawsuit."22 
The Court's reasoning in reaching its decision was not entirely 
clear. Chief Justice Burger's dissent, in fact, asserted that there was 
virtually no argument for the decision.23 The decision does, however, 
appear to be based on two important considerations. First, the rule 
of collateral estoppel has long been successfully applied to criminal 
cases in the federal courts.24 It has never been necessary, however, to 
determine whether the doctrine was a constitutional right since the 
Supreme Court possessed the power to impose it upon the federal 
courts by way of the Court's general supervisory power over the 
federal court system.25 But even though the federal courts have never 
specifically declared collateral estoppel to be a constitutional require-
ment, federal judges have been so impressed with the basic fairness 
of the doctrine that they have elevated it almost to the status of a 
fundamental right of the accused.26 Justice Stewart, in the majority 
opinion in Ashe, recognized the general acceptance of the federal rule 
and the practical results reached in many cases through its applica-
tion. 27 For Justice Stewart, the only question was whether this firmly 
established federal rule was embodied in the guarantee against double 
jeopardy and was therefore a constitutional requirement to be ap-
plied to the states.28 The successful application of this rule by the 
federal courts, then, seemed to be a very important factor in the 
Court's decision that the rule had constitutional status. 
But the fact that the federal courts have traditionally used the 
22. 397 U.S. at 443. 
23. The Chief Justice said in dissent that "the only expressed rationale for the 
majority's decision is that Ashe has 'run the gantlet' once before," and later that 
"[t]his is decision by slogan.'' 397 U.S. at 465. 
24. See, e.g., Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Adams, 
281 U.S. 202 (1930); Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923); United States v. Oppenheimer, 
242 U.S. 85 (1916); United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); Yawn v. 
United States, 244 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1957); Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d 146 
(9th Cir. 1955); Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950); United States 
v. Curzio, 170 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1948); Ehrlich v. United States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 
1944); United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v. Cowart, 
118 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1954); United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). 
25. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See also Ashe v. Swenson, 
397 U.S. 436, 464 (1970) (Chief Justice Burger, dissenting). 
26. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). In Kramer the 
defendant was first acquitted of burglarizing United States post offices. The court found 
that since the acquittal could only mean that the jury had believed defendant's denial 
of any participation whatsoever in the burglaries, a subsequent prosecution for con• 
spiracy and receiving stolen goods was prohibited by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
Judge Friendly, in his opinion for the majority, gave great weight to the fairness 
inherent in the doctrine. The opinion also contains an excellent discussion of most 
of the aspects of the application of collateral estoppel in federal criminal cases. 
27. 397 U.S. at 443. 
28. 397 U.S. at 445. 
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doctrine of collateral estoppel in a criminal context was not sufficient 
to make that doctrine a constitutional requirement. This continued 
use, however, gave the Court a practical framework in which to de-
termine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel was a part of the 
guarantee against double jeopardy. The major reason for the decision 
in Ashe was the Court's recognition that collateral estoppel is similar 
both in purpose and policy to double jeopardy and that in some in-
stances the former doctrine would promote their common purposes 
much better than would the traditional double jeopardy rule barring 
reprosecution after acquittal. Justice Stewart made it clear that the 
Court considers the guarantee against double jeopardy to be a basic, 
fundamental protection that should be guarded.29 According to the 
majority opinion, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied in 
the guarantee against double jeopardy because "whatever else that 
guarantee may embrace ... it surely protects a man who has been 
acquitted from having to 'run the gantlet' a second time."30 Thus, 
the Court appears to be indicating that collateral estoppel should 
have the effect in Ashe that the double jeopardy guarantee should 
have-to prevent a man from having to run the gantlet of a criminal 
trial two times. It seems clear from a variety of indications by the 
Justices31 that the Court was concerned that the purpose of the double 
jeopardy guarantee was being eroded through judicial interpreta-
tion and that it realized that collateral estoppel would in many cases 
promote the purposes of the traditional double jeopardy rule. These 
factors were at the core of the Court's decision. 
It is, therefore, important in any analysis of the Ashe decision to 
examine the policies and purposes behind collateral estoppel and 
double jeopardy and the current effectiveness of the two doctrines in 
light of these policies and purposes. The policies of the double 
jeopardy guarantee are well defined in the federal cases.32 Basically, 
it is recognized that the state, having at hand many more resources 
than the average defendant can muster, should not be allowed to make 
29. 397 U.S. at 445-46 n.10. The history and purpose of the double jeopardy clause 
and the gradual erosion of its protection are described by Justice Stewart at 397 U.S. 
at 445-46 n.10. 
30. 397 U.S. at 445-46. 
31. The language of the holding that collateral estoppel is "embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy," 397 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added), 
connotes an identity of purpose and effect in the two doctrines. Furthermore, the con-
curring opinions lend support to this interpretation. Justice Black stated that the 
double jeopardy clause should prevent the government from subjecting a defendant 
to the hazard of two trials for the same offense and that the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel is basic to the prohibition against double jeopardy. 397 U.S. at 447-48. Justice 
Harlan stated that Ashe's second trial brought "double jeopardy standards into play," 
397 U.S. at 448. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, simply agreed 
that the "Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates collateral estoppel." 397 U.S. at 448. 
32. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957): United States v. Kramer, 
289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). Kramer is discussed in note 26 supra. 
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successive attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense. 
Successive prosecutions cause the defendant expense and embarrass-
ment and force him to live in a state of insecurity knowing that the 
end of one trial may not necessarily be the end of his troubles.33 The 
state ought not to be allowed to retry a defendant for the purpose 
of finding the right combination of convincing evidence and a will-
ing jury that will finally produce a conviction.34 Nor should the state 
be permitted to use the criminal process as a means of arbitrarily 
harassing an individual.35 
At the time of the early development of the common-law rule 
against double jeopardy, the objectives outlined above were well 
implemented by a rule such as that required by the double jeopardy 
clause.36 Subsequent developments, however, stripped this rule of 
much of its utility. First, as the Supreme Court noted in Ashe, the 
number of legal categories at early common law was quite small and 
the scope of each was very large.37 When the rule stated, therefore, 
that successive prosecutions for the same offense were prohibited, the 
law did not distinguish between the legal meaning of offense and the 
underlying factual transaction.38 One or a series of criminal acts was 
likely to yield but one single "offense."39 More recently, however, 
trends toward specificity in legal draftsmanship and the existence of 
large numbers of specific and overlapping statutory offenses have 
made it easy for prosecutors to find a number of indictable offenses 
in virtually any criminal transaction:10 Thus, although the problem 
of multiple prosecutions, not multiple indictments, was the specific 
issue in the Ashe case, the availability of multiple indictments makes 
it possible to bring a number of prosecutions for different offenses 
against one person who has engaged in but one criminal transaction. 
This multiple-indictment factor decreases the utility of the tradi-
tional double jeopardy rule. 
In addition to increased specificity of crimes, the problem of 
33. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957). 
34. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 734 (1969) Oustice Douglas, concurring). 
See also Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1957) (Chief Justice Warren, dissent-
ing). The Court in Ashe pointed out that the prosecution had admitted having 
"treated the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution •••• " 397 
U.S. at 447. 
35. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 733 (1969) (Justice Douglas, concurring). 
36. See Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life 
for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 341-43 (1956); Note, 
Double Jeopardy and the Multiple Count Indictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132 (1947). See 
also Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REv. 317 
(1954). For a general history of the doctrine of double jeopardy, see J. SIGLER, DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL PoUCY (1969). 
37. 397 U.S. at 445 n.10. 
38. 397 U.S. at 445 n.10. 
39. See Comment, supra note 36, at 342 n.14. 
40. Id. at 344. See also Note, supra note 36, at 133. 
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multiple prosecutions is compounded in the federal courts and in 
the majority of the state courts by the definition that those courts 
give to what constitutes the "same offense" for purposes of the 
fifth amendment.41 The test for "same offense" was stated in the 
leading case of Blockburger v. United States.42 When a criminal act 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test 
to determine whether there are one or two offenses is whether either 
provision requires proof of facts that the other does not.43 Offenses 
are the same for purposes of the traditional double jeopardy rule only 
when the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of the 
indictments is sufficient also to give rise to a conviction upon the 
other.44 
Such a test can lead to an extremely restrictive application of the 
double jeopardy rule. Very few separate offenses arising in a given 
situation will require exactly the same evidence in order to convict 
the defendant. In Blockburger, for example, the defendant was con-
victed, on the basis of a single act, both of selling morphine not in 
or from the original stamped packet and of selling morphine not 
pursuant to a written order of the purchaser. In Wood v. United 
States,45 one sale supported five separate counts of violations of the 
narcotics laws. The possibilities inherent in more complex criminal 
acts or in several acts constituting the same transaction seem infinite. 
Some commentators, faced with this state of affairs, concluded that 
in actuality the traditional double jeopardy guarantee no longer 
existed in a meaningful form. 46 
It was with this critical situation in mind that the Court in Ashe 
considered the constitutional status of the collateral-estoppel doctrine. 
The basic policy considerations for this doctrine, when it is applied 
to criminal cases, are nearly identical to the objectives of the tradi-
tional double jeopardy rule barring reprosecution after acquittal.'7 
41. It can be argued that in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the 
Court decided by implication that many, if not all, of the federal standards concerning 
double jeopardy existing prior to Benton are part of the constitutional guarantee 
against double jeopardy and, therefore, apply to the states by virtue of Benton. If this 
were the case, the same-offense test applied by the federal courts would, by virtue 
of Benton, be the minimum standard in the state courts. In Pearce the Court held that 
the federal requirement that punishment already exacted must be fully credited in 
imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense was also required of 
the states by the double jeopardy clause. 
42. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
43. 284 U.S. at 304. 
44. United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961). For a complete dis• 
cussion of double jeopardy standards in the federal courts, see Orfield, Double Jeopardy 
in Federal Criminal Cases, 3 CAL. WFSr. L. R.Ev. 76 (1967). 
45. 317 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1963). 
46. See Comment, supra note 36; Note, Double Jeopardy: A Vanishing Constitutional 
Right, 14 How. LJ. 360 (1968). 
47. See United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Lugar. 
March 1971] Recent Developments 769 
The Court recognized this close similarity and also recognized that 
collateral estoppel would often achieve the same ends as the tradi-
tional double jeopardy rule.48 Further, collateral estoppel would in 
many cases accomplish what the double jeopardy clause was designed 
to do but until the Ashe decision could not do. In Ashe, for example, 
the defendant could not plead double jeopardy because the robberies 
of different victims constituted separate offenses under the same-
evidence rule.49 The Supreme Court recognized that such a result was 
unfair to the defendant and violated the purposes of the double 
jeopardy guarantee.I'° Collateral estoppel, however, could be applied 
in this case to protect the defendant. The only conceivable issue be-
fore the first jury was·whether Ashe was one of the robbers.51 The 
general verdict acquitting Ashe in the first trial could have only been 
a decision on that one issue, and, therefore, the Court held that the 
prosecution was collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue in 
a second trial.52 Hence, collateral estoppel in Ashe was employed to 
effect the purposes of double jeopardy when the protection of the 
latter doctrine was unavailable to the defendant. 
If the bases for the holding that collateral estoppel is embodied 
in the double jeopardy clause are that both doctrines spring from the 
same policy considerations and that collateral estoppel will often 
promote these considerations when double jeopardy will not, the 
question remains how successfully the former doctrine protects the 
policies of the latter. This inquiry becomes especially relevant in 
light of the fact that an alternative "cure" for the ailing double 
jeopardy guarantee was proposed by three members of the Court in a 
concurring opinion by Justice Brennan.53 Justice Brennan suggested 
that the definition of the term "offense" be changed to give the 
double jeopardy clause a broader scope of application. This proposed 
solution will be discussed below in relation to the relative success of 
the collateral-estoppel "cure."54 
supra note 36, at 330; Meyers 8e Yarbrough, Bix Vexari: New Trials and Successive 
Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REY. 1, 29 (1960). 
48. 397 U.S. at 445-46 n.10. See also Meyers 8e Yarbrough, supra note 47; Com-
ment, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 28 U. CHI. L. REY. 142 (1960); Comment, 
Double Jeopardy: Vandercomb to Cichos-Two Centuries of Judicial Failure in Search 
of a Standard, 45 J.URBAN L. 405 (1967); Comment, supra note 17; Note, Collateral 
Estoppel in Criminal Cases-A. Supplement to the Double Jeopardy Protection, 21 RUT• 
GERS L. REY. 274 (1967). 
49. Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40, 45 (8th Cir. 1968). See also State v. Citius, 331 Mo. 
605, 56 S.W .2d 72 (1932). 
50. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See note 3 supra. 
52. 397 U.S. at 446. 
53. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion. 
397 U.S. at 448. 
54. See text accompanying notes 93-96 infra. 
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The first difficulty attending collateral estoppel in criminal cases 
that might act to limit that doctrine's application is the problem of 
the general verdict. 155 In order for an issue to be barred in a second 
trial, it is necessary that the issue be put in contention and finally 
determined in the first trial. 56 In the case of a general verdict of 
acquittal, the court must first determine exactly what issues were 
decided by the jury,157 for if it is not possible to make such a deter-
mination no estoppel will arise.158 While it is certain in such a case 
that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond a reason-
able doubt, it is often unclear whether the jury has affirmatively 
decided a particular issue in the defendant's favor. Considering only 
the pleadings of the parties, the instructions to the jury, and the 
verdict of not guilty, it is usually impossible to determine the jury's 
decision on the specific issue in question. The federal courts, how-
ever, have established a more liberal procedure for discovering which 
issues were determined by the jury. 
In Seal/on v. United States,59 the Supreme Court made it very 
clear that in determining what issues were decided, consideration 
must be given not only to the pleadings, instructions, and verdict, 
but that the inquiry "must be set in a practical frame and viewed 
with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings."60 The Court 
in Ashe realized that if a court did not take such an approach the col-
lateral-estoppel rule would be rendered ineffective: 
The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral 
estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertech-
nical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with 
realism and rationality. Where a previous judgment of acquittal was 
based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach 
requires the court to "examine the record of a prior proceeding ... 
and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict 
upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to fore-
close from consideration."61 
The Court, then, clearly included this aspect of the federal rule as 
part of the constitutional requirement of collateral estoppel.62 
55. See Comment, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, supra note 48, at 144. 
56. REsrATEMENT OF JUDGMEN'IS § 68, comment a (1942). See also United States v. 
Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
57. United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961). 
58. See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). See also Comment, 28 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 142, supra note 48, at 144. 
59. 332 U.S. 575 (1948). 
60. 332 U.S. at 579. 
61. 397 U.S. at 444, quoting with approval Meyers 8: Yarbrough, supra note 47, 
at 38-39. For an interesting discussion on jury behavior in this context, see Comment, 
28 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, supra note 48, at 146. 
62. A state court applying A.she assumed that this manner of interpreting a general 
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This practical approach, of course, will not solve all of the dif-
ficulties involved in the general-verdict question. First, the Seal/ on 
rule is hardly explicit, and it is subject to various interpretations in 
the trial courts, particularly overly strict ones. Such an application 
can be controlled to some degree by access to appellate courts. But a 
more difficult problem-a problem inherent in the collateral-estoppel 
rule as applied to criminal cases-is the likelihood that even a 
liberal application of the Seal/ on rule will not suffice to identify 
what issues were affirmatively decided in the defendant's favor by the 
jury. In United States v. Kenny,63 for example, Kenny and his 
partners were tried first for having knowingly made false state-
ments in affidavits relating to contracts within the jurisdiction of a 
federal agency. After being acquitted in this first case, Kenny was 
tried alone in a second case for making other false statements. Since 
it was proven that Kenny himself did not sign any of the affidavits 
containing the alleged false statements, the fact of his partnership 
with the man who did sign the affidavit was a necessary ingredient of 
the prosecution's case. But, in the first trial, the jury could have found 
either that the requisite intent was not present in signing the docu-
ments or that no partnership existed. The court held, therefore, that 
since it could not be determined with accuracy which fact actually 
was determined in the defendant's favor, the issue of partnership 
was not barred by collateral estoppel in the second trial. 64 In such a 
case, and in many-if not most--other kinds of complicated criminal 
proceedings, it will be difficult or impossible to determine with any 
specificity what was decided by the jury. In a great many criminal 
cases, therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will not apply.65 
In these cases, defendants will be left with the old standards of 
double jeopardy and the accompanying unfairness that goes with 
those standards.66 
Furthermore, the general verdict places a defendant in a most 
troublesome dilemma. He must either put a very few of his defenses 
in issue, thereby assuring a collateral-estoppel effect in any fu-
ture proceeding, but at the same time risking a conviction by not put-
verdict was indeed a requirement of the Ashe holding. Commonwealth v. Cole, 7 
Caw. L. REP. 2355 (Pa. C.P. June 6, 1970). 
63. 236 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1956). 
64. 236 F.2d at 130-31. See also United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948); 
United States v. Perrone, 161 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
65, See Lugar, supra note 36, at 344. 
Some writers have proposed that the problem of the general verdict could be 
corrected by instituting special verdicts in criminal cases. See Developments in the 
Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 874-78 (1952), But this idea has not been 
well received by the courts in criminal cases. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 
178 (1953); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 183 (1st Cir. 1969). 
66. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. 
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ting his other valid defenses in issue; or he must put all the de-
fenses he has before the jury, thereby better shielding himself against 
a conviction, but unfortunately destroying the possibility of any 
future collateral-estoppel effect on all of the issues raised by these de-
fenses. 67 While normally the risk of the first conviction would be 
great enough to make this choice very easy, in certain extraordinary 
cases when the sentence for the first charge is light and there is a sub-
stantial possibility of later harassment by the prosecution, this choice 
might become important. To force such a choice on a defendant is, 
of course, most unfair; and, again, the Ashe solution to the ineffec-
tiveness of the traditional double jeopardy rule does not really meet 
the problem. 
A rel~ted difficulty that courts may encounter in applying the 
Ashe decision is the problem whether the distinction made in the 
civil area between ultimate and mediate facts should be used when 
collateral estoppel is applied in criminal cases. As defined in The 
Evergreens v. Nunan,68 ultimate facts are those "which the law 
makes the occasion for imposing its sanctions."69 They are, in other 
words, the facts that determine finally whether the defendant is to be 
exonerated or held liable. Mediate facts, on the other hand, are those 
from which the defendant's liability or nonliability is merely in-
ferred. 70 Collateral estoppel applies only to those issues that were 
ultimate in the first action. The policy behind this doctrine in civil 
cases is the fear that the other party may not have had a fair op-
portunity to litigate fully those issues that were not ultimate in the 
first _action. But a strict application of this doctrine in criminal cases 
would severely limit the utility of collateral estoppel. For example, if a 
defendant were acquitted of robbing Bank A, the only ultimate fact 
determined might be that defendant did not commit the act of rob-
bing Bank A. Even if it could be shown that the jury had determined 
that defendant did not rob Bank A because he was out of the city 
on that day, a prosecutor could still try him for robbing Bank B on 
that same day. The defendant would have to "run the gantlet" again 
on the issue whether he was in the city on the day of the robberies 
because that issue was not ultimate in the first trial. Since most of-
fenses would in fact require different ultimate facts in order to result 
in conviction, the Ashe decision would have a very limited effect. 
It has been argued that since the policy reasons for collateral estop-
pel are different in the criminal area, the ultimate-fact rule should not 
67. See Lugar, supra note 36, at 347; Comment, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, supra note 
48, at 147. 
68. 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). 
69. 141 F.2d at 928. 
70. 141 F.2d at 928. 
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apply in criminal cases.71 In criminal law, the state is more likely to 
have a chance in the first trial to litigate fully all the issues than would 
either of the parties in a civil action.72 Also, it could be argued that 
the Ashe holding prohibits an application of the ultimate-fact rule in 
the criminal context. The Court in Ashe spoke of the danger of apply-
ing archaic and hypertechnical rules,73 and the ultimate-fact rule 
does appear to be a hypertechnical rule in the criminal area. More 
important, the facts in Ashe are not consistent with a strict applica-
tion of the ultimate-fact rule. The ultimate fact established in the 
first trial was that Ashe had not robbed Knight. This finding was not 
contradictory to the ultimate fact that the prosecution tried to prove 
in the second case-that Ashe robbed Roberts, another victim of 
the robbery. The Court did mention the term "ultimate fact" in its 
definition of collateral estoppel;74 yet the Court did not say what 
definition of ultimate fact is included in collateral estoppel. Clearly, 
a strict application of the ultimate-fact rule would not be permitted 
in the criminal context; but does the Court's reference to ultimate 
facts mean that the rule is to be of some effect in that context? The 
Supreme Court left the lower courts to speculate on this issue and 
perhaps again to limit the collateral-estoppel rule. 
There is, in fact, already evidence of possible confusion in inter-
preting the Ashe decision. In United States v. Fusco,75 the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that collateral estoppel barred a 
second prosecution of a defendant for possession of stolen goods after 
the first conviction for the theft of the goods had been reversed by 
that court on the grounds of insufficient evidence. The court cited 
Ashe as controlling in the case but by way of dictum indicated that 
it would strictly apply the rule of ultimate facts.76 The court then 
cited an example that it said would not present a double jeopardy 
situation: a bank robber, while escaping from the bank, kills a man; 
he is first tried for bank robbery and then in a second trial is prose-
cuted for murder. The court concluded that since the "ultimate facts" 
to be determined in the prosecution for these different offenses would 
be different, collateral estoppel would not bar a second trial.77 It ap-
71. See United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir. 1961), in which the court 
quoted with approval a statement by Professor Scott in Scott, Introduction, 39 IowA L 
R.Ev. 214,216 (1954), referring to the policy differences between the two areas. 
72. See Note, supra note 48, at 281. 
73. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
74. 397 U.S. at 443. 
75. 427 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1970). 
76. 427 F.2d at 363. 
77. 427 F.2d at 363. There is some doubt that even a very strict interpretation of 
the ultimate-fact rule would yield this result. The ultimate fact determined by acquittal 
in the first trial would be that the defendant did not rob the bank. In the trial for 
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pears that the court in Fusco was confused in its interpretation of the 
ultimate-fact rule. For collateral estoppel to apply, it is not necessary 
that the second trial be for an offense that concerns the same ultimate 
facts as the first offense. Collateral estoppel applies to issues, not of-
fenses.78 If an issue is ultimate in the first action, collateral estoppel 
applies. The court's dictum in Fusco also indicates that the Ashe de-
cision did not make clear what the rule concerning ultimate facts is 
to be. In the absence of such a clear expression of the rule, lower 
courts may continue to be confused in their application of the Ashe 
holding.79 
Another possible difficulty stems from the fact that collateral 
estoppel is applicable only in the case of a final judgment on the 
merits.80 Actually, this requirement is quite reasonable since a final 
judgment is necessary in order to know with any certainty what 
issues were determined in the defendant's favor. But the requirement 
does give rise to serious limitations. While double jeopardy will apply 
when a mistrial is declared because the government is unable or fails 
to proceed,81 collateral estoppel will not. Thus, the prosecutor may, 
given the knowledge that his case is weak, fail to proceed further. 
The doctrine of double jeopardy will prevent him from trying the 
murder, if the evidence tended to show that the same man robbed the bank and 
committed the murder, the fact that defendant did not rob the bank. would exonerate 
him of the murder. 
78. See text accompanying note 22 supra. 
79. Such confusion might arise from "joining" the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
with the double jeopardy rule against retrial after acquittal. Conceptually, the scope 
of operation of the traditional notions of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel are 
quite different. Double jeopardy applies in some cases when collateral estoppel does 
not apply, and collateral estoppel applies in some cases in which double jeopardy does 
not apply. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203 (1966). The traditional rules are incompatible to 
a degree, and this incompatibility might lead to confusion in the interpretation en Ashe. 
The Fusco court, for example, apparently believed that because collateral estoppel was 
required by the double jeopardy clause, a same-offense test must be applied in order 
to determine whether collateral estoppel is available in a particular case. The court 
determined that the same-offense test involves an inquiry into whether the same ulti-
mate facts are required to prove both prosecutions. The Supreme Court's opinion in 
Ashe, of course, gave no indication that collateral estoppel should be so restricted simply 
because it is a rule of the double jeopardy clause. The opinion merely asserted that 
the federal rule of collateral estoppel was a constitutional requirement. 397 U.S. 
at 445. Collateral estoppel is a rule of double jeopardy because, like the double 
jeopardy rule against reprosecution, it prevents the state from making the accused 
"run the gantlet" twice. A same-offense test should not be imposed upon that rule. 
80. See United States v. Harriman, 130 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
81. For example, in Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), the jury in the 
first trial was discharged because of the absence of a prosecution witness upon whom a 
subpoena could not be served and whose testimony was essential in order to prove two 
of the six counts of the indictment. The Supreme Court held that a second trial placed 
the defendant in double jeopardy. See also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); 
Comero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931). For a complete discussion of when 
double jeopardy attaches, see Orfield, supra note 44, at 77; Note, Double Jeopardy: The 
Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1272, 1275 (1969). 
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defendant again for the same offense, but when he prosecutes the 
defendant a second time for a slightly different offense, collateral 
estoppel will not be available as a defense since the first trial never 
reached a final judgment on the merits. The Ashe decision does not 
explicitly prohibit this method of prosecutorial harassment, although 
it can be argued that since the Court made collateral estoppel a rule 
of double jeopardy and since double jeopardy does not always require 
a final judgment in order to apply, collateral estoppel may not in 
some cases require a final judgment. But the Ashe decision gives no 
indication that the Court meant to change the :final-judgment re-
quirement of the collateral-estoppel rule, and again the lower courts 
are left to speculate on how to deal with this problem in light of 
Ashe. 
The question of mutuality also presents a possible point of con-
fusion concerning the Ashe holding, although that question may be 
less troublesome than the problems presented by the ultimate-fact 
and :final-judgment rules. In civil actions, collateral estoppel must be 
capable of application by both parties in order to be available to 
either.82 An application of the rule of mutuality in criminal cases, 
however, might result in constitutional difficulties. A right of col-
lateral estoppel on the part of the prosecution would appear to deny a 
defendant's right to a jury trial on the issue involved and to violate 
the presumption of innocence in the second trial.83 An accused is 
also constitutionally entitled to a "trial de novo of the facts alleged 
and offered in support of each offense charged against him and to a 
jury's independent finding with respect thereto."84 The federal courts 
have recognized these difficulties and have not required mutuality of 
estoppel in criminal cases.85 The Court in Ashe quoted with approval 
the statement from United Statesv. Kramer that "[i]t is much too late 
to suggest that this principal is not fully applicable to a former 
judgment in a criminal case ... because of lack of 'mutuality' .... "86 
It may safely be assumed, therefore, that the Court in Ashe recognized 
the problem of mutuality and intended that the federal practice of 
not requiring mutuality be continued. As a result, the mutuality is-
sue should not give the lower courts any difficulty in applying the 
Ashe rule. 
A final limiting aspect of collateral estoppel is that facts or issues 
that are sought to be estopped must have already been litigated and 
determined as between the same parties. 87 In criminal cases, this 
82. See Kirby v. Pennsylvania R.R., 188 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1951). 
83. See Comment, 28 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 142, supra note 48, at 149. 
84. United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943), quoted in United 
States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 919 (2d Cir. 1961). 
85. See, eg., United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 919 (2d Cir. 1961). 
86. 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961), quoted at 397 U. S. at 443. 
87. See Moore v. United States, 344 F.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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requirement of identity of parties means that collateral estoppel 
cannot apply when different sovereignties prosecute a defendant. An 
acquittal by a state court, for example, may not be used to estop an 
issue involved in a subsequent federal prosecution. 88 It has been 
argued that the identity-of-parties requirement, like the mutuality 
requirement, has no place in the application of collateral estoppel in 
the criminal context. 89 Since the doctrine of collateral estoppel is 
meant to afford a defendant greater security from the harassment of 
multiple trials and since the interests of one sovereign will frequently 
be adequately protected in a prosecution by the other sovereign, this 
argument is well taken. Nevertheless, since the federal courts appear 
to have accepted the identity-of-parties requirement,00 and since the 
Ashe opinion made no attempt to change the rule,91 it is fairly certain 
that for the time being that requirement will act as another limita-
tion on the collateral-estoppel doctrine.92 
It appears, then, that if the Supreme Court was concerned about 
the ineffectiveness of the double jeopardy clause and that if it based 
its decision in Ashe for the most part on the belief that elevating 
collateral estoppel to constitutional status would increase a defen-
dant's protection under that clause, the decision has not accomplished 
as much as the Court intended. It should be considered whether the 
solution proposed by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion93 is 
more logical than the majority's solution and would be more effective 
in accomplishing the goals that the Court had in mind. Justice Bren-
nan suggested that a more complete cure for the ailing double 
jeopardy guarantee would be to change the definition of what con-
stitutes an offense. The same-evidence test, he said, is not constitu-
tionally required and could be changed upon a showing that another 
test would more successfully protect the objectives of the double 
jeopardy guarantee.94 Justice Brennan offered an alternative test-
the same-transactfon test-the effect of which would be to require 
the prosecution, except in limited circumstances, to "join at one 
trial all the charges against a defendant which grow out of a single 
88. See Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1965). 
89. See Note, supra note 48, at Z77. 
90. See Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1965). 
91. " ••• [T]hat issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any 
future lawsuit." 397 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added). 
92. In Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), the Court held that the State of 
Florida and its municipalities were not separate sovereign entities each entitled to im-
pose punishment for the same alleged crime. See Recent Development, 68 MICH, L. 
Rn'. 336 (1969). If Waller points to the possibility of a re-examination of Bartkus v. 
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), in which the Court held that both the state and federal 
government could try a defendant for the same bank robbery, then any subsequent 
change in the double jeopardy rule might in tum change the collateral-estoppel rule. 
93. 397 U.S. at 448. 
94. 397 U.S. at 452, 
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act, occurrence, episode or transaction."95 Although this test, as it is 
applied in certain jurisdictions, is not without limitations of its 
own,00 a careful formulation of the collateral-estoppel doctrine based 
upon this test might more nearly fulfill the objectives of the double 
jeopardy rule and might be a more logically consistent solution to 
the current ineffectiveness of that rule. 
Since the majority's solution in Ashe does so little to deal with 
that ineffectiveness, it seems clear that the Court will have occasion 
to consider the double jeopardy problem again in the near future. 
The Court may then be more willing to give a closer examination 
to Justice Brennan's solution to the problem. But until that or some 
other solution is adopted by the Court, the double jeopardy guar-
antee-even with the added protection of the collateral-estoppel doc-
trine-will continue to be an illusory guarantee. The Ashe decision 
will lend substance to that guarantee only in narrow, infrequent, and 
at present, uncertain instances,97 while in most cases the objectives of 
the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause will remain discourag-
ingly unfulfilled. 
95. 897 U.S. at 458-54. See also Lugar, supra note 86, at 828; Comment, 45 J. URBAN 
L 405, supra note 48, at 444; Note, supra note 48, at 275. 
96. See Lugar, supra note 86, at 324. 
97. It is outside the scope of this Recent Development to discuss in any detail the 
specific effects that an application of collateral estoppel would have in various criminal 
situations. For a fairly complete discussion of these effects, see Perkins, Collateral Estop-
pel in Criminal Cases, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 549. See also Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203 
(1966). 
